Thailand’s Strategic Pivot Towards BRICS

At the end of last year, Thailand asked India to support its bid for full BRICS membership. This signalled a deliberate effort to deepen integration with emerging markets. Since becoming a partner state at the start of 2025, Thailand has also sent positive diplomatic signals to China in a bid to strengthen its regional influence and capitalise on new economic opportunities. 

Thailand is the second-largest economy in Southeast Asia, a leading motor vehicle producer, and the world’s largest rice exporter. Integrating more deeply with the BRICS may help Thailand leverage these existing strengths within a framework designed to promote trade and investment between the world’s most important emerging market economies.

Thailand’s deeper engagement with BRICS also complements its growing ties with its largest trading partner, China. Thailand’s strategy is an example of pragmatic statecraft in which it can be expected to maintain established security relationships with Washington while developing other partnerships that provide long-term technological and economic advantages.

King Maha Vajiralongkorn’s five-day state visit to Beijing in November last year was significant, marking the first visit by a reigning Thai monarch to China since the establishment of diplomatic relations fifty years ago. This was only the king’s second foreign visit of his reign, highlighting the strategic importance Thailand places on its relationship with China.

Royal visits in Thailand are highly prestigious events. By choosing China, the Thai king sent a powerful signal to business leaders, investors, and the general public that Beijing is a crucial partner. At the same time, the monarchy’s neutrality provided cover for initiatives that might otherwise be politically sensitive in a country prone to frequent leadership changes.

King Vajiralongkorn’s visit reflects a noticeable shift in Thailand’s geopolitical orientation. His father, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, worked hard to maintain a strong alliance with the US during the Cold War. As such, this potential pivot from Washington to Beijing likely reflects the growing economic importance of China to both Thailand and the entire South-East Asia region.  

The foundations for closer China ties had already been quietly laid through educational and cultural engagements, including frequent visits by Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn and her receipt of China’s Friendship Medal. These high profile diplomatic engagements are not simply performative, and will lead to closer trade, investment, and security ties between these nations.

Joint projects already include the China-Thailand high-speed railway, expanded agricultural trade, and joint investments in advanced sectors such as electric vehicles, green technology, and digital platforms. Security cooperation has also deepened, with joint Thailand-China military exercises and anti-narcotics operations taking place which Thailand would have formerly conducted exclusively with the US.

This should come as no surprise when you follow the money. Bilateral trade with China reached $76 billion in the first half of 2025, a massive 17% year-on-year increase. At the same time, the types of investments Chinese firms are making in Thailand are rapidly shifting from traditional infrastructure towards high-value add sectors, including battery production, electric vehicles, and other advanced electronics. As a result, Thailand is rapidly emerging as a regional hub for high-tech exports.

Tourism is another major factor with Chinese visitors accounting for a significant proportion of international arrivals and providing a consistent source of revenue for the Thai service sector. Taken together, these factors suggest that Thailand’s pivot to BRICS is grounded in concrete economic realities and not just royal symbolism.

Thailand’s expanding industrial base and growing digital economy make it well positioned to integrate effectively into BRICS trade and investment networks where increasing access to capital, technology, and regional markets complement Thailand’s structural strengths while mitigating the risks associated with the slowing growth rates seen in developed economies.

Thailand’s full membership in BRICS would also extend the bloc’s influence into Southeast Asia while consolidating Thailand’s position in the region. As a partner state, Thailand has already participated in meetings and working groups, building familiarity with the ideas and procedures of the alliance. As such, its recent outreach to India demonstrates a calculated approach in which Bangkok seeks to build broader relationships beyond its strengthening ties with Beijing.

BRICS membership would also offer the Thai government access to the New Development Bank and its local currencies loans which enable members to raise capital for development projects while reducing pressure on the foreign currency reserves countries use to pay for imports and service their US dollar denominated debts.

BRICS membership could also lead to increased Thai participation in regional development projects ranging from logistics corridors to large scale renewable energy installations. Thai inclusion would also give Bangkok a voice in shaping regulatory standards and trade policies between developing economies while making Thailand an attractive investment destination.

At the same time, Thailand’s pivot towards BRICS has implications beyond regional economics. It demonstrates that middle powers can pursue pragmatic strategies that maximize opportunity without alienating traditional partners.

The various recent US reversals on sanctions policies to contain Russia, China, and Iran have all illustrated the limits of Washington’s BRICS containment strategy. As more states line up to join the grouping its importance can be expected to grow over time.  

While the US remains a key economic and security partner to Thailand and other emerging market economies, diversifying trade and investment relations will likely prove beneficial for countries looking to maintain economic stability in an era of erratic Western policy making.   

Deeper integration into China’s renewable energy, battery, and electric vehicle supply chains could also help Thailand reduce its dependence on foreign energy imports. This has become a major talking point for several net energy importers following the War on Iran and could emerge as a significant motivator for closer co-operation with China for a number of nations.   

For South African investors and policymakers, Thailand’s approach is instructive. It illustrates the benefits of identifying structural opportunities in emerging markets, cultivating long-term partnerships, and leveraging multipolar networks. As BRICS continues to expand, states that engage effectively can access trade, capital, and technology while avoiding confrontation.

As the BRICS bloc continues to grow, Thailand’s increased participation highlights the potential for Southeast Asian countries to play a more influential role in the future of the global economy. While achieving full BRICS membership may not represent a dramatic reversal in Thai foreign policy, it would symbolise the growing influence of BRICS in an era of geopolitical uncertainty.